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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAIRY D~STRIBUTORS, INC., I 
a corpora bon, Pl . t .If azn z ., 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE 
COUNTY AND HONORABLE I 
LEWIS JONES, Judge thereof, 
and LOCAL UNION 976, a labor 
organization, D f d t e en an s. 
PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
No. 
9847 
Come now the defendants in the above entitled 
proceeding and move the court to grant a rehearing in 
this cause upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING 
JURISDICTION OF A SUIT IN EQUITY 
ORIGINALLY ENTITLED IN THIS COURT 
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AS LOCAL UNION 976, A LABOR ORGANI-
ZATION, PLAINTIFF, VS. DAIRY DIS-
TRIBUTORS, INC., A CORPORATION, DE-
FENDANT, AND IN DISPOSING OF THE 
SAME UNDER THE ABOVE ENTITLED 1 
CAUSE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
COMPLY WITH THAT PROVISION OF 
RULE 76 (a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEREIN IT IS DI-
RECTED THAT "EVERY DECISION OF THE 
COURT (SUPRE~iE COURT ON REHEAR-
ING) TOGETIIER WITH THE REASONS 
THEREFOR, CONSISELY STATED, SHALL 
BE IN WRITING AND FILED WITH THE 
CLERK." 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER DAIRY DISTRIB-
UTORS AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF 
WAS OR WAS NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED BY, IN EFFECT, 
DECIDING TIIAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, 
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AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF, HAD A 
PER~IIT TO ENGAGE IN INTERSTATE 
COl\I~IERCE, NOTWITHSTANDING ALL 
THE EVIDENCE, PI.-~US THE ADMISSION 
OF COUNSEL FOR DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, 
CLEARLY SHOWS THAT IT DID NOT 
HA YE ANY PERMIT, CONTRACT, COM-
JION, PRIVATE OR OTHERWISE. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS 
SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUN-
TY THAT ANY AMENDMENTS THERETO 
OR ANY E'TIDENCE THAT MAY BE SUB-
MITTED WOULD BE OF NO ASSISTANCE 
TO LOCAL UNION 976 IN ITS PURSUIT OF 
RELIEF. 
We, the undersigned attorneys for the parties 
above named defendants, hereby certify that in our 
opinion there is merit to this petition for a rehearing 
and the same is not filed for the purpose of delay. 
OMER J. CALL 
ELIAS HANSEN 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
CLARENCE BECK 
Attorneys for above named 
Defendants 
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ARGUMENT 
We are mindful that the courts do not look with 
favor of petitions for rehearing. However, if counsel 
believe in their opinion that material error has been 
committed, it would seem to be their duty to the court 
and the interest of parties to prevail upon the court to 
correct such errors. In this case counsel for Local Union 
976 feel obligated to exhaust all available legal means 
to secure a decision from a court of last resort putting 
at rest the question of whether or not a party may 
lawfully engage in the business in which Dairy Dis-
tributors was engaged at the time complained of. This 
proceeding is of major importance and consequence not 
only to the labor organizations directly involved but 
to all common and contract carriers engaged in inter-
state commerce. The amount of unauthorized trans-
portation in interstate commerce has been variously 
estimated at from 4.57o to about 507o of all interstate 
commerce. Bureau of Transportation Economics and 
Statistics Statement No. 6010, Gray Area of Trans-
portation Operations, Page 13 ( 1960), Traffic 'Vorld, 
Volume 107, No. 9, Page 29 (~larch 4, 1961). The 
interests of the regulated carriers in interstate com-
merce by motor vehicles was made evident by the ap-
pearance of Grant, Shafroth, Toll and McHendrie and 
John F. Muller, Denver attorneys, as amici curiae in 
the case of Dairy Distributors, Inc., appellants, vs. 
Western Conference of Teamsters in the Federal lOth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 294 Fed. 2nd 348, referred 
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to in the pleadings filed in the District Court of Cache 
County. 
By way of illustration we quote from former Gov-
ernor and Senator of Colorado Edwin C. Johnson, 
long time Chairman of the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce and presently a director 
of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 
wherein he testified before the Senate Committee on 
February 7, 1962, re S.2560 to wit: 
"To borrow from Herodotus 'neither snow, 
nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night would stay 
the Common Carrier from the swift completion 
of his appointed rounds, in serving the public 
with whatever transportation it required, when 
it required it.' A certificate to operate as a regu-
la ted Common Carrier was not a license to do 
what the carrier pleased. To the contrary the 
unregulated carrier may go where he pleases, 
when he pleases and how he pleases, provided his 
load is either agricultural exempt commodities 
or his own property. But these fellows needed 
back hauls to n1ake their trips pay and they be-
gan looking for loop holes in the law and they 
found them. They discovered some slick ways to 
beat the law too, and they began digging pretty 
deep into common carrier traffic for their back 
hauls. 
"As this Cornmittee knows, some of the un-
regulated carriers purchased a truck or two on 
a small down payment and had to earn a dollar 
wherever and however they could to meet the 
future payments. While some well financed 
businesses do transport their own property of 
course, but they too need a back haul and they do 
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try to obtain one. Much of the time it requires 
a bit of finagling to do this. There are all sorts 
of variations in lining up back hauls for the un-
regulated-some legal and some illegal. It is 
estimated that unregulated trucks do two-thirds 
of the trucking business and that nearly 20% 
of it is illegal. The Undersecretary of Commerce 
is quoted as saying, 'That portion of the Inter-
state Commerce Act pertaining to motor carriers 
is probably the most violated statute in the 
land.' 
"Private and exempt carriers cannot compete 
with the common carriers without a back haul. 
They cannot mooch traffic for that back haul 
from the common carriers legally, yet they do 
mooch it. In some instances trip leasing is the 
modus operandi, or the guy-and-sell gyp, the 
Phony Co-op, the shady broker, and many other 
fraudulent devices. Loop holes must be closed 
and law breakers punished. Lax, weak, ambigu-
ous and ill considered provisions of our laws has 
invited invasion by the unregulated carriers. 
Loop holes have been discovered and successfully 
used by them. Chislers have moved in also. Bold-
ness in some cases has ripened into wholesale 
disregard for the intent of the law. 
"Due to widespread destructive competition it 
now appears that interstate trucking is reverting 
to the chaos and confusion that prevailed prior 
to August 9th, 1935. And due to their heavy 
capital investment in idle equipment, road beds 
and tracks, the railroads are suffering greater 
losses than the motor common carriers in some 
parts of our country, from this unfair and de-
structive cmnpetition. 'Vith commendable pa-
tience the common carriers have tried hard and 
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have practiced co-existence with the unregulated 
but it will not work . . . " 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING 
JURISDICTION OF A SUIT IN EQUITY 
ORIGINALLY ENTITLED IN THIS COURT 
AS LOCAL UNION 976, A LABOR ORGANI-
ZATION, PLAINTIFF, VS. DAIRY DIS-
TRIBUTORS, INC., A CORPORATION, DE-
FENDANT, AND IN DISPOSING OF THE 
SAME UNDER THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
CAUSE. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contains among 
its provisions, Rule I: 
" . . . these rules shall govern the procedure 
in the Supreme Court, the district courts, city 
courts, and justice courts of the State of Utah 
in all actions, suits and proceedings of a civil 
nature whether cognizable in law or in equity 
" 
Rule 10 (a): 
"Every pleading shall contain a caption, set-
ting forth the name of the court, the title of the 
action, the file number, and a designation as in 
Rule 7 (a) . In the Complaint, the title of the 
action shall include the names of all the parties 
but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the 
name of the first party on each side with an 
appropriate indication of other parties." 
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In this case, the pleadings by which Dairy Dis-
tributors sought to vest this court with jurisdiction 
placed Local Union 976, a labor organization as plain-
tiff and Dairy Distributors, Inc., a corporation, as 
defendant. In the decision rendered, Dairy Distributors 
was made plaintiff while Local Union 976 was made 
a defendant and the District Court and Honorable 
Lewis Jones were added as parties in the title as addi-
tional defendants. Apparently the change was made by 
the court without any motion or other pleading request-
ing such change. 1\..s was pointed out in the briefs filed 
at the time of hearings herein in this court, it is generally 
held that a proceeding for a writ of prohibition is an 
independent proceeding and in no sense an appeal from 
a decision of a lower court. The initial means of vesting 
this court with jurisdiction of the parties when an 
action is brought to prohibit further proceedings is by 
making the court and parties in interest defendants in 
the action. The rules above cited so provide. The authori-
ties heretofore cited, particularly the case if in re Evans 
et al., 42 Utah 285, 130 Pac. 217, teach that the means 
of giving a court jurisdiction of an action is by a proper 
pleading. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
COMPLY WITH T HAT PROVISION OF 
RULE 76 (a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CI"VIL PROCEDlTRE 'VHEREIN IT IS DI-
8 
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RECTED THAT "E\rERY DECISION OF THE 
COURT (SUPRE~IE COURT ON REHEAR-
ING) TOGETHER WITH THE REASONS 
TH:E.REFOR, CONSISEL Y STATED, SHALIJ 
BE IN WitiTING AND FILED WITH THE 
CLERK." 
The only grounds urged by Dairy Distributors in 
the argument recently had in this cause before this court 
was that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Local 
Union 976 being heard in the District Court of Cache 
County in its equity suit to enjoin the enforcement of 
the judgment rendered against it in favor of Dairy 
Distributors. In its Complaint filed in the District Court 
in Cache County all of the facts in the proceedings 
which were deemed necessary prior to the bringing of 
such equitable suit were alleged. In the argument of 
counsel for Dairy Distributors they therein apparently 
relied solely upon the doctrine of res judicata and 
stressed the fact that there had already been a number 
of proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment 
and that there should be an end to litigation. The atten- , 
tion of the court is called to the law which teaches that ' 
before relief may be had in equity, the one so seeking 
relief must first exhaust his legal remedies. Such doc-
trine is applied in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a 
judgment. See 49 C.J.S., Sec. 343, Page 695. It will 
be seen that numerous cases are cited in footnotes to 
the text above mentioned. We have examined a number 
of the cases there cited, all of which support the text. 
Of course, the members of this court will not have the 
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time to read all of the cases, but the case of Lind vs. 
Moyer, 20 Pac. 2nd 794, 52 Idaho 986, shows the trend 
of judicial authority. Thus if Local 976 not not par-
ticipated in the appeal to this court and the effort to 
secure a review of the decision by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, it would be confronted with the 
doctrine that it had not exhausted all of its legal reme-
dies before it brought its suit in equity to enjoin en-
forcement of the judgment against it. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DETERMINE 'VIIETHER DAIRY DISTRIB-
UTORS AT THE Til\'lE COMPLAINED OF 
WAS OR WAS NOT A CONTRACT CARRIER. 
In neither of the proceedings had in this court on 
the original appeal or in its opinion in this court has 
the court decided whether or not Dairy Distributors at 
the time complained of was or was not a contract carrier, 
and as such declared to have a permit from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission before it could lawfully 
engage in transporting goods in interstate commerce. 
Nor was such a determination had in the trial of this 
cause in the Third District Court of Utah, nor in the 
decision rendered by the United States lOth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 294 Fed. 2nd 348. That Dairy Dis-
tributors was engaged in interstate commerce was de-
cided by the United States District Court and such find-
10 
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ing of the Federal District Court has never been re-
versed, disturbed or challenged by any court. As we 
have heretofore pointed out in the briefs heretofore 
filed herein, the Complaint filed by Dairy Distributors 
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County dis-
closes and the case authorities affirmatively show that 
Dairy Distributors was a contract carrier at the time 
complained of. From our investigation of the authori-
ties, all agreed that it is of controlling importance in 
actions such as that which resulted in the judgment 
against Local 976 to ascertain whether Dairy Distribu-
tors was or was not a contract carrier at the time com-
plained of. The Utah Supreme Court in its decisions 
in the cases of Olsen vs. Reese, 200 Pac. 2nd 733, and 
Eklund vs. Elwell, 211 Pac. 2nd 849, commit the court 
to the doctrine that one engaged in a business requiring 
a permit to engage in a business must allege and prove 
that he had such a permit before he can recover damages 
to such business. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED BY, IN EFFECT, 
DECIDING THAT DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, 
AT THE TIME COMPLAINED OF, HAD A 
PERMIT TO ENGAGE IN INTERSTATE 
CO~IMERCE, NOTWITHSTANDING ALL 
THE EVIDENCE, PI.JUS THE ADMISSION 
OF COUNSEL FOR DAIRY DISTRIBUTORS, 
CLEARLY SI-IOWS THAT IT DID NOT 
11 
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HAVE ANY PERMIT, CONTRACT, COlVI-
MON, PRIVATE OR OTHERWISE. 
The case decided by this court upon the appeal 
from the judgment rendered in Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County against Local Union 976 and 
others was fundamentally an entirely different case 
from that shown by the evidence and the admission of 
counsel for Dairy Distributors to be the facts. If Dairy 
Distributors, at the time complained of, had a permit 
to engage in the business in which it was engaged, it is 
obvious that no one could be heard to complain of its 
operation on the ground that it did not have a permit. 
On the other hand if Dairy Distributors was, at the 
time complained of, engaged in transporting goods in 
interstate commerce as a contract carrier without hav-
ing the required permit from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, it would seem equally obvious that such 
business was illegal. So far as the records and the 
various proceedings had in which Local Union 976 w:as 
a party, including the decision of this court on appeal, 
the judgment against it could not have been rendered 
or sustained if the fact that Dairy Distributors did not 
have a license had been noted and considered. If it 
should be said that the court might have decided the 
case against Local Union 976 on some other ground, 
the answer is that such a speculation does not aid the 
claim that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a 
direct attack on such a judgment. It would seem that 
the purpose of adopting the Rules of Civil Procedure 
heretofore mentioned was to enable the parties litigant 
12 
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to know just what had been decided. Independent of 
such rules, the law seems settled that before a judgment 
may be said to be res judicata, the law and the facts 
must be the same in both cases. We again direct the 
attention of the court to the law announced in 50 C.J.S., 
Sec. 719, Page 198 et seq., and such cases as Paine and 
"rilliams Company vs. Baldwin Rubber Company, 113 
Fed. 2nd 840, and Hamilton vs. Comb, 7 5 Pac. 2nd 39. 
IVIay it be said that a case in which a contract carrier 
has a permit to engage in interstate commerce that the 
law and the facts are the same as in a case where a 
contract carrier does not have such a permit? May a 
court, by accident or mistake or otherwise, deprive a 
party to a litigation of his defense by making or ap-
proving a finding of controlling importance contrary 
to all the evidence and the admission of the party in 
whose favor a judgment is rendered? We submit that 
is the duty and responsibility of a court in equity, that 
is what it is for and that it shall and will grant relief 
from such a judgment, as we understand the law an-
nounced by the courts generally and by this court in 
such cases as Bank vs. Goss, 300 Pac. 277; Benson vs. 
Anderson, 11 Utah 135; and Taylor vs. Guaranty 
Mortgage Company, 62 Utah 520, 220 Pac. 1067; see 
also 49 C.J.S. 707-708 and cases cited in footnotes to 
the text. 
13 
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT PURSUANT TO THE ALLEGATIONS 
SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT FILED IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUN-
TY THAT ANY AMENDMENTS THERETO 
OR ANY EVIDENCE THAT MAY BE SUB-
MITTED WOULD BE OF NO ASSISTANCE 
TO LOCAL UNION 976 IN ITS PURSUIT OF 
RELIEF. 
As will be noted from the authorities cited, the 
doctrine of res judicata is not a rule of law but a policy 
in the nature of an estoppel; it is not encouraged by 
the courts. That is to say, the doctrine of res judicata 
is yieldable and flexible and so intended to be. It is not 
a Procrustesan rule of the Medes and Persians. It 
presupposes a day in court and a fair trial by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
If a complaint is found wanting it 
" ... may be amended as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one in which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action 
has not been placed on the trial calendar, he may 
so amend at any time within twenty days after 
it is served." Rule 15 (a). 
So also: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent by the par-
14 
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ties they shall be treated in all respects as if they 
had been raised in the pleadings." Rule 15 (b). 
If we are wrong in assuming that the decisions 
rendered in this case are based solely upon the doctrine 
of res judicata, we direct the attention of the court to 
what we conceive to be the law applicable to some other 
facts alleged in the Complaint filed in the District Court 
of Cache County. Doubtless it will be agreed that Local 
976 is not bound by decisions rendered in the United 
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals because it was 
not a party to that suit or in privity with the Western 
Conference of Teamsters. However, during the course 
of this argument, the Chief Justice remembered that 
it was some time since the judgment was rendered 
against Local 976. It cannot successfully be claimed 
that Dairy Distributors was prejudiced by any delay 
in bringing this action. There was no occasion to have 
two actions pending against Dairy Distributors at the 
same time. Moreover, if the case brought in the District 
Court of Cache County had been permitted to be heard, 
the Local Union 976 would have had a good reason 
for the delay or at least this court may not asssume the 
contrary. 
In commenting on the permit or license issue in 
the opinion of the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, it is stated, "from the record before us and the 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah, we cannot clear-
ly determine whether the Utah Court considered and 
acted upon that issue." The Chief Justice remembered 
15 
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that this court is not bound by that statement, to which 
counsel for Local 976 agreed, but even so, such state-
ment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
is some evidence that the opinion of this court is so 
uncertain that the doctrine of res judicata does not pre-
clude Local Uno in 976 from maintaining the present 
action. At the oral argument, counsel for Dairy Dis-
tributors urged the fact that the Supreme Court of the 
United States had denied application for a writ of 
certiorari which precluded Local 976 from maintaining 
an action to enjoin the judgment here involved. It is 
generally known that the Supreme Court of the United 
States of necessity will hear only those cases in which 
questions of public importance are involved and in 
which the circuit courts of appeals or state courts of last 
resort are in conflict as to questions of law. In this case, 
the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals and 
this court do not appear to be in conflict as to the law. 
Had this court decided that Dairy Distributors was a 
contract carrier, as the record manifestly shows, but 
did not need a permit from the Interstate Commerce 
Commission before it could lawfully engage in inter-
state commerce, it is reasonable to assume that the 
Supreme Court of the lJnited States would not have 
denied certiorari. In this connection, it may be observed 
that as stated in the case of Norris vs. Alabama, 294 
U.S. 587, 55 Supreme Court SCT 597, 79 Law Ed 
1094, that the evidence in a case is examined only when 
it becomes necessary to do so to determine whether a 
federal right has been denied. Thus, if this court had, 
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in its opinion, made a finding in conformity with the 
evidence and admission of the counsel for Dairy Dis-
tributors that Dairy Distributors did not, at the time 
complained of, have a permit from Interstate Com-
merce Commission to engage in interstate commerce, it 
is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court of the 
United States would have taken jurisdiction and set at 
rest the question which divides the parties to this con-
troversy. Nor is there any basis for a finding that Local 
976 or its agents or attorneys were guilty of any negli-
gence that would preclude Local 976 from prosecuting 
the action pending in the District Court of Cache 
County. If that proceeding had been heard, the evidence 
would have shown that counsel for Local Union 976 
was informed that Dairy Distributors had the necessary 
permits to engage in the commerce that it was conduct-
ing at the time complained of. It was not until the 
examination of Mr. Gassner, the president and manager 
of Dairy Distributors, that it become known that Dairy 
Distributors did not have the required permit. 
In this connection we invite the court's attention 
to this aspect. The plaintiff's complaint in the Salt Lake 
County District Court makes no mention of a federal 
statute, hence that court's jurisdiction would have been 
obviously pre-empted unless such action would fall 
under the provisions of Sec. 301 and 303 of the federal 
Labor Management Relations Act 1947, which provi-
sions drastically limit the state court's jurisdiction in 
such behalf. Among the indispensible requisites to the 
state court's jurisdiction is that plaintiff's transportation 
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business must involve interstate commerce. Manifestly 
therefore plaintiff may not invoke one federal act regu-
lating interstate commerce while in criminal violation 
of another act regulating interstate commerce and 
recover legally damages to an illegal business. However, 
if it does so recover, then in such event a court of equity 
would be obligated to examine the matter to determine 
whether the limits of the court's power and authority 
had been exceeded or fundamental rights denied. 
A state court of general jurisdiction deriving its 
power and authority from state law presents a different 
situation than where a state court derives its power and 
authority exclusively from a federal statute limiting 
the authority and jurisdiction of such state court and 
more expressly where the issues involved are virtually 
IOOlfo federal questions of law. 
"A court exercising equitable powers can en-
join persons from taking advantage of a judg-
ment of any court of the state even though it is 
a court to which it is subordinate. Thus, a court 
of equity whose judgments are subject to be 
overruled by the supreme court of the state, can 
properly enjoin a party from utilizing a judg-
ment which was improperly obtained, although 
the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court." Judgments-Restatement, Para. 114, 
Page 551. 
Moreover, if Judge Jones had been permitted to 
continue within the scope of his equity jurisdiction and 
had found as a matter of fact that Dairy Distributors, 
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Inc., was operating an illegal business for the loss of 
which no recovery rna y be had-res judicata would be 
patently inapplicable if that was the fact, notwithstand-
ing this doctrine was relied upon by Dairy Distributors, 
Inc., to support its interim quest for a writ of pro-
hibition to interrupt such proceeding. It is familiar 
doctrine that equity may always be invoked to obtain 
judicial review to protect an assert~d essential right. 
See opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in the case of 
Shields vs. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, 80 
L. Ed. 111, 305 U.S. 177, and cases cited. 
Probably no useful purpose will be served by ex-
tending this brief. vVe have already repeated some 
matters that are covered by the briefs heretofore filed 
in the proceedings had before this court. The facts were 
gone into at considerable length in the briefs filed when 
the case was before this court on appeal. If the court 
should so desire, doubtless the facts, together with the 
law, which we contend are aplicable to such facts, are 
available in the records which have been filed in this 
court. In conclusion Local Union 976 urges that this 
court re-examine the facts and the law applicable to 
this case to the end that the decisions heretofore rendered 
be vacated and the relief sought by Dairy Distributors 
be denied, or if that is not done, that the court grant 
the relief prayed for in the case brought in the District 
Court of Cache County to the end that if Dairy Dis-
tributors are entitled to any relief as a result of acts 
complained of, that such relief be granted only after 
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trial is had which is free from the errors which, we sub-
mit, render the judgment heretofore entered unenforce-
able. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
OMERJ.CALL 
ELIAS HANSEN 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
CLARENCE BECK 
Attorneys for above named 
Defendants 
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